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Master’s Degree in Forensic Psychology @ University of Nebraska-Lincoln

February 8, 2012 By Comments

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t=”" width=”200″ height=”150″ />After having reviewed the five fully online masters programs in forensic psychology, numerous requests were received for more information on the campus-based masters programs in forensic psychology that are available. Thus, this series of articles will review each of the masters programs in forensic psychology and provide information on each program in a similar format so as to assist in comparisons between the various options.

The goal of this series of articles is simply to provide information in a consistent format to assist those individuals who are considering an education in forensic psychology and not to convince anyone to attend a particular program. Having been a professor in this field for the last 13 years I am familiar at some level with almost every forensic psychology program available in North America. Many undergraduate students are not familiar with all the possible options and so this series will lay them out in a consistent format for ease of comparison.

Masters Degree in Forensic Psychology –University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Program Description

From the website: The Law-Psychology Program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln is one of the leading centers for education and research in the interdisciplinary study of law and psychology. In existence since 1974, our program trains scholars who are engaged in basic and applied research and writing on psychosocial issues and problems related to the law. The Department of Psychology and the College of Law jointly sponsor the program, which is the world’s oldest ongoing integrated program in psycholegal studies. It remains unusual in the breadth of training with students specializing in virtually any area of psycholegal studies. Law-psychology faculty and students focus their studies in traditionally important psycholegal areas such as jury decision-making, eyewitness memory, children’s decision-making, distributive and procedural justice, domestic violence, criminal responsibility, juvenile justice, the admissibility of scientific evidence in litigation, and so on. They also work on less-studied topics, such as tax compliance, altruistic behavior, child support, death penalty issues, sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, mental health, financial literacy, bankruptcy, alternative dispute resolution, health care policy issues, and elder law.

The Law-Psychology Program offers interdisciplinary training in psychology and law. The Program specializes in training scholars who will be able to apply psychology and other social and behavioral sciences to analyses of empirical questions in law and policy. Students in the program study and apply theory and research from social, cognitive, clinical, and developmental psychology to problems of law and policy. The Law-Psychology program trains researchers and professionals to identify and evaluate the psychological assumptions underlying laws and court decisions and to apply their psycholegal expertise to improve understanding of the operation of law in our society.

Graduates of the program work in universities, research or public interest organizations, or in local, state or federal government. Graduates go on to take positions in a variety of settings specializing in diverse tasks and problems. For example, recent graduates work in universities (i.e. John Jay College, Florida International University, University of Nevada, and Carelton University), research or public interest organizations, law firms, jury consulting organizations, and the courts. Faculty and graduate students regularly consult with government and private agencies applying psycholegal scholarship to problems of law in everyday life.

The JD/MA Track

The J.D./M.A. track is for students who wish to be legal practitioners but who also desire to obtain a strong background in psychology or social science methods. It provides sufficient background in interdisciplinary studies, social science methods, and psychological knowledge to permit thorough evaluation of psychological research and practice and interdisciplinary collaboration in policy formation or implementation. In addition to interdisciplinary courses, J.D./M.A. students take courses designed to provide an overview of psychological research, theory and methods. In the first year, students take the same Law College curriculum as the rest of the first year law students. During subsequent years, students take courses from both the Law College and the Psychology Department tailored for their individual programs. Most students will complete the program in about four years and the M.A. degree is presumed to be terminal.

Credits

The program is a 4-year program, with the first year being completed at the Law School. The website does not easily delineate the number of credit hours required form this joint MA/JD program.

Thesis

Students are required to complete a thesis in this program.

Externship/Practicum

The focus of the MA/JD joint degree is on research; therefore a clinical externship is not part of the program requirements. It does appear, however, that supervised fieldwork in law and psychology is available; this fieldwork would emphasize the integration of legal analysis and psychological research in the formulation or implementation of public policy.

Admission Requirements

From the website: Applicants are required to have the following:

  • B.A. or B.S. degree with a major in psychology (see below if you are a non-psychology major)
  • Laboratory course in experimental psychology
  • Undergraduate course in statistics
  • Typically a grade point average (GPA) of 3.5 or higher on a 4.0 scale (see below if your GPA is below 3.5)
  • GRE scores (Verbal, Quantitative, Written)
  • GRE Subject Test is recommended if not a psychology major
  • LSAT, if applying for a JD

Applicants to the Law and Psychology program must also submit a law school application to the UNL College of Law.

Tuition & Fees

Tuition and fees at UNL vary by College, which means that the tuition is most likely different for the law school classes and the psychology classes. Interested students should call the program for more detailed information.

In-State Residents

$236-$380 per credit hour

Out-of-State Residents

$275 – $978 per credit hour

Coursework

The coursework for the joint MA/JD degree is not easily set out on the program website. The first year is taken in the Law School along with the rest of the incoming law class. The subsequent 3 years are a mix of law and psychology courses. Students who are interested in this joint MA/JD program are advised to contact the program directly for more specific information.

Law and Psychology Courses

  • 985. Law and Behavioral Science (LAW 762G) (1-4 cr)
  • 988. Mental Health Law (LAW 763G) (1-4 cr)
  • 989. Topics in Law and Psychology I (LAW 764G) (1-4 cr per sem)
  • 989. Topics in Law and Psychology II (LAW 765G) (1-4 cr per sem)
  • 995. Psycholegal Research Other than Thesis I (LAW 757G) (3-6 cr)
  • 995. Psycholegal Research Other than Thesis II (LAW 758G) (3-6 cr)
  • 998. Practicum in Law and Psychology (3 cr per sem, max 6) Prereq: Full graduate standing in Law/Psychology Graduate Training Program or permission of the director of the Law/Psychology Program.

Concluding Comments

The University of Nebraska-Lincoln has one of the longest standing and well-recognized Law and Psychology graduate programs. The majority of the students admitted to UNL are admitted to the doctoral degree programs. They do offer a joint MA/JD program for those students not interested in doctoral-level education. This program has a strong emphasis on research and prepares students to be legal practitioners with specific knowledge in psychology and social science methods. The Masters program is terminal, meaning that students do not typically do on to doctoral-level training within the same program. Students who desire a doctoral-level degree are encouraged to consider the doctoral programs at UNL.

Filed Under: Education & Training, Masters Programs Tagged With: , , , , , , , ,

Developments in Mental Health Law, Vol. 31 (1)

December 17, 2011 By Comments

Developments in Mental Health Law is a free publication of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, School of Law. It is published electronically six times per year through funding provided by the Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services. The following was excerpted from Volume 31, Issue 1, edited by Jane D. Hickey.

Below are brief summaries of recently decided or currently pending cases in mental health law.

 

DOJ Settles ADA Investigation of Delaware Psychiatric Center

The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) entered into a Settlement Agreement with the State of Delaware in July 2011 resolving its investigation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of the Delaware Psychiatric Center, the State’s only state-run facility for persons with mental illness. United States v. Delaware, Civil Action No. 11-591-LPS (July 6, 2011). The Settlement Agreement followed DOJ’s on-site inspections of the hospital and community programs conducted in May 2008 and August 2010 and the issuance of its investigative “findings” letter on November, 9, 2010.

The Agreement requires Delaware to implement programs and services to prevent institutionalization of at-risk individuals by offering community-based services in accordance with a strict 5-year implementation schedule beginning with the date of the Agreement and ending July 1, 2016. The target population to be served under the agreement includes individuals with serious and persistent mental illness who are at highest risk of institutionalization whose symptoms manifested in the last year, resulted in functional impairment which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities and has episodic, recurrent or persistent features. Priority for receipt of services must be given to people currently at Delaware Psychiatric Center, including those on forensic status, people discharged from the Delaware Psychiatric Center in the last two years, people admitted to private institutions for mental disease (“IMDs”), people who have had an emergency room visit in the last year due to mental illness or substance abuse, people who have been arrested, incarcerated or had encounters with law enforcement in the last year due to mental illness, people who have been homeless a full year or had four or more episodes of homelessness in the last three years, and people who have requested services or who have been referred for services by others in the last year.

Services provided must be implemented statewide and be linguistically and culturally competent, solution-focused and recovery-oriented. Mandated services include crisis services, including a crisis hotline, mobile crisis teams, crisis walk-in centers, crisis stabilization services, and crisis apartments, intensive support services, including assertive community treatment, intensive case management, and case management with specific caseload limits specified, housing, including supported housing, supported employment and rehabilitation services, and family and peer supports.

Each individual now in or being admitted to the Delaware Psychiatric Center or an IMD must have a transition plan developed through a person-centered planning process that identifies barriers to placement and steps that will be taken to address the barriers. A central specialized transition team must also be established to focus on individuals when teams have identified that the person is to remain in the Psychiatric Center or an IMD or placed in a less integrated setting, such a congregate living or a nursing home, or who have intensive behavioral or medical needs. Once a plan has been developed, the person must be discharged within 30 days. For individuals on forensic status, the State must educate judges on the recommended placement and services. All individuals must be reassessed with 30 days of the signing of this Agreement and the transitional and specialized teams must be in place within 60 days.

Central to the Settlement Agreement is a comprehensive risk management and performance improvement system that must be approved by the Monitor. The system includes a provision that all providers, including community providers have a risk management and performance improvement plan in place, including a requirement that they complete a root cause analysis within 10 days of any person receiving services experiencing harm. Harm includes any physical or emotional injury, whether caused by abuse, neglect or accidental injury. Corrective action plans must be developed and the State must establish a Performance Improvement Section that will monitor and follow-up on implementation of all corrective action plans. These expectations must be included in all contracts the State enters into with providers and must be performance-based. The State must also develop a detailed data collection process and utilize the data to identify quality of care trends and to ensure a continuous loop of performance evaluation and improvement.

DOJ and the State also appointed a Monitor, Robert Bernstein, Ph.D., to oversee all aspects of the settlement implementation. The Monitor operates as an officer of the court with authority to independently observe, report on and make recommendations concerning the State’s compliance. He has unimpeded and unmonitored access to all facilities, services, programs, staff, individuals receiving services, individual records and services plans, risk management and quality improvement documents, and receive reports of serious incidents and deaths, and state implementation reports. The Monitor must report to the court, DOJ and Delaware twice a year on Delaware’s progress towards implementation of the Agreement. To carry out his duties and responsibilities, the Monitor may hire staff and consultants to assist him. Delaware must pay all the Monitor’s expenses, making an initial deposit of $100,000 into a court-managed fund upon which the Monitor will draw and which the State will replenish monthly.

Robert Bernstein is a clinical psychologist and President and Executive Director of the David J. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law in Washington, D.C. Virginia will remember him as a Department of Justice consultant in its investigations of the Northern Virginia Mental Health Institute and Western State Hospital in the 1990s.

This Settlement Agreement is similar to the one DOJ entered into with the State of Georgia in November 2010 with respect to its mental health services. DOJ also conducted an on-site investigation under the ADA of Central Virginia Training Center near Lynchburg, Virginia in August 2011 concerning services provided to individuals with intellectual disabilities, the same month it concluded its investigation of the Delaware Psychiatric Center, and issued an investigative “findings” letter to Governor Robert McDonnell on February 10, 2011. Virginia has been negotiating corrective action with DOJ since that time and can expect any DOJ settlement demands to include statewide implementation of comprehensive services, similar to those negotiated with Delaware for persons with mental illness, designed to lead to a community-oriented system to be implemented on a tight time line and subject to strict monitoring and oversight.

Washington Supreme Court Holds No Constitutional Mandate to Determine Competency to Represent Self

The Washington Supreme Court has held that a trial court is not constitutionally required to independently determine whether a defendant was sufficiently competent to waive counsel when he had previously been found competent to stand trial following a pre-trial hearing. In re Rhome, 2011 Wash. LEXIS 743 (September 15, 2011). The court held that a defendant’s mental health status is but one factor a trial court may consider in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and to represent himself.

In this case, Rhome was charged with first degree murder with a deadly weapon of a 17-year old girl. Another juvenile confessed to stabbing the girl but identified the defendant as the “mastermind” behind the killing. Since early childhood, the defendant had been treated for psychiatric disturbances, including several in-patient psychiatric hospitalizations. He had received a myriad of diagnoses including, psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, mild mental retardation, obsessive/compulsive traits, and pervasive developmental disorder (Aspergers disorder). The trial court held a competency hearing finding that the defendant had not proved he was incompetent to stand trial. Throughout the pre-trial proceedings, the defendant asserted his right to represent himself. The court first denied his request to proceed pro se indicating that his ability to do so was equivocal. After his renewed request, the court advised him of the risks and engaged in coloquy to determine if he understood the significance of this undertaking. His mental health issues were not specifically addressed during the colloquy. The court granted his request and appointed standby counsel to assist him. The jury convicted the defendant and he was sentence to 30 years in prison. A mental health expert for the defense who later examined the defendant’s performance in representing himself testified that his mental illness impacted his ability to defend himself in court. He testified that the defendant engaged in perseverative and aggressive questioning that was incoherent or intimidating, and he was unable to self-regulate his emotions and behavior.

In June 2008, just following the state courts’ denial of the defendant’s direct appeals, the United States Supreme Court decided Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that a trial court could insist that a defendant proceed with counsel even though the court had found the defendant was competent to stand trial. The Washington Court stated that the Edwards decision assumes that a defendant will “assist” in his defense, not “conduct” his defense when the defendant has been found competent to stand trial. Competency to stand trial does not equate with the right to represent oneself and the Supreme Court declined to set a standard for the state to follow. In determining whether a defendant has the right to waive counsel, the court considers his background, experience and conduct, which may include his history of mental illness. In denying his petition for post-conviction relief, the Washington Supreme Court held that a defendant’s mental health status is but one factor a trial court must consider in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. An independent determination of competency for self-representation is not a constitutional mandate.

First Circuit Denies Habeas Relief That Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Request Competency Evaluation

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has denied habeas corpus relief to a petitioner who was convicted of first degree murder in Massachusetts who allowed his 11-month old son to die based upon his religious beliefs. He argued that his counsel at trial was ineffective because he had an obligation to seek a competency to stand trial evaluation and that he failed to raise an insanity or diminished capacity defense. Robidoux v. O’Brien, 643 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2011).

The defendant in this case was a member of a religious sect led by his father that believed that a number of institutions, including the legal system, medical system and mainstream religion were invalid and its members were instructed to eschew doctors and medicines. The evidence showed that until he was about 8 months old, the child was thriving and well nourished, but about that time the defendant’s sister got a “leading,” instructing that the mother should feed the child only breast milk in limited quantities. Thereafter, the infant began to fail. The defendant and his wife failed to take the infant to a doctor or to provide him with a proper diet. The day after the sect conducted a special meeting to pray for the child, he died. After concealing the body in his sister’s house for several months, the defendant buried the baby in Maine. The police located the body a year after the burial when a defector from the sect reported the death to authorities.

At trial, the defendant argued that the prosecution could not prove the cause of death was malnutrition, based upon the testimony of his forensic expert that the infant could have died from any number of causes. The chief medical examiner testified that the condition of the decomposed body was indicative of severe malnutrition due to starvation. The defendant testified in his own defense that he had no intent to harm the child. The jury convicted him of first degree murder and he was sentenced to life in prison.

In seeking habeas corpus relief, the defendant argued primarily that his counsel should have pursued an insanity or diminished capacity defense based upon three affidavits, the first from a psychologist who never interviewed the defendant stating that the defendant was unable to appreciate or understand that it was wrong to deprive his son of solid food. The Director of the New England Institute for Religious Research stated that the defendant’s father exercised undue influence over him and other sect members that made it impossible for counsel to present an adequate defense. The defendant himself filed an affidavit stating that counsel discussed the insanity defense with him, but he refused to talk with a doctor or psychotherapist prior to trial due to his religious beliefs.

The trial court found that counsel properly defended the case based upon the judge’s own observations of the defendant in court, the answers provided in colloquies from the bench, and his testimony at trial, even though he presented a rambling eve-of-trial motion to represent himself saying the government had no jurisdiction to try him, which she found appeared a tactic to delay trial. No fact-finding hearing was conducted on his competency to stand trial.

The First Circuit articulated the standard in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that there must be proof that counsel fell below the minimum standards of representation and there was a reasonable probability that the deficiency altered the outcome of the case. Where raising a particular defense is a strategy choice, counsel will be given special deference. On the other hand, if substantial indications exist that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, counsel is not faced with a strategy but with a settled obligation under Massachusetts and federal law to raise the issue with the court and seek a competency evaluation. Competency is a functional concept focusing on the defendant’s part in the trial, namely whether the defendant understands the nature of the proceedings against him and is able to assist counsel in his defense. In this case, it appears that he argued that the government had no legitimate authority over him, but he engaged in an intelligent and articulate colloquy with the court and as a witness. There was no evidence that the defendant had ever suffered from a mental illness or that he failed to understand the proceedings or cooperate with counsel. Although state court findings are generally accorded no deference absent an evidentiary hearing, there was no evidence presented that a competency hearing was necessary.

In addition, the 1st Circuit held that the defendant could decline to assert an insanity defense and refuse a psychiatric examination, which he apparently did. His current defense counsel argued that he suffered from a delusional disorder based on his religious illusions that God and prayer, not ordinary nourishment, would protect his son. He also argued that his diminished capacity prevented him from forming the necessary intent to support a conviction for first degree murder. The appellate court held that there was no evidence to support a mental illness and that the law provides for the denial of medical care in certain situations based upon religious beliefs, such as for example, those held by Christian Scientists and Seventh Day Adventists, but the evidence, including the defendant’s own testimony indicated that he understood the risk.

 

Filed Under: Developments in Mental Health Law, Professional Info Tagged With: , ,

New York Law School and John Jay College to offer a Joint MA/JD Degree Program

December 8, 2011 By Comments

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height=”182″ />This article describes the new joint Masters in Forensic Psychology and Law degree offered by John Jay College of Criminal Justice and New York Law School, including admission requirements, curriculum content, and FAQs.

MA-JD Program in Forensic Psychology and Law

An MA-JD dual-degree program in Forensic Psychology and Law, offered through NY Law School (NYLS) and John Jay College (JJC) has been officially approved by NY State, and is now beginning at the two institutions. Interested students must apply to and be accepted by both institutions and must complete one full year at one institution before beginning their second full year at the other. The advantage of the combined program is that 12 specific JJC credits can be counted towards the JD, while 12 specific online JD credits at NYLS can be counted towards the MA, thus saving 24 total credits, the equivalent to one full year of study.

Degree Requirements

The Four-Year Forensic Psychology MA/JD offers qualified students the opportunity to earn both a John Jay Master of Arts degree in Forensic Psychology and a New York Law School Juris Doctor degree in Law which may be completed in as little as four years. The curriculum is composed of the existing required and elective courses for the MA and for the JD, requiring a combined total of 128 credits, including 42 credits for the completion of the MA Program in Forensic Psychology and 86 credits for the completion of the JD Program in Law. However, 12 New York Law School credits focusing on mental disability law will be credited towards both the JD and the MA Program. Likewise 12 MA credits from the John Jay Forensic Psychology MA Program will be credited also to the New York Law School JD program. Consequently, due to the 24 transfer credits applied in the dual degree program, the actual number of credits taken will be 104, resulting in graduation for full-time students in four years instead of five.

The MA Program in Forensic Psychology will consist of 24 required credits; 15 forensic elective credits, including 12 credits from the NY Law School Mental Health and Disability Law track; and 3 credits of externship.

The JD from New York Law School will consist of 41 required credits, 12 credits from the Mental Disability Law Studies, 12 transfer credits from the JJC MA Forensic Psychology Program, and 21 additional law school elective credits.

Students will be required to complete their first full year of law school without John Jay MA courses during that regimen; and they are likewise required to complete their first year of the MA Program in Forensic Psychology (24 Credits) without NY Law School courses (except for those counting towards the MA degree) during that period. However, they have the option of starting their first year in either of the two degree programs.

Required Courses

MA Program in Forensic Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice (42 Credits, including 12 Transfer Credits from New York Law School)

Required MA Courses (24 Credits)

• PSY 700 – Mental Health Professionals, Social Science, and the Law

• PSY 715 – Research Methods

• PSY 745 – Psychopathology

• PSY 769 – Intermediate Statistics in the Social Sciences

• PSY 731 – Human Growth and Development or PSY 741 – Theories of Personality and Counseling

• PSY 760 – Counseling & Psychotherapy Methods or PSY 761 – Clinical Interviewing & Assessment

• PSY 734 – Criminal Psychological Assessment

• PSY 754 – Advanced Forensic Assessment

Required MA Supervised Externship (3 Credits)

• PSY 780 – Fieldwork in Counseling I

MA Forensic Electives (15 Credits)

Mental Health and Disability Law Electives (Select 4 courses, 12 Credits from NY Law School)

• CRI 507 – Survey of Mental Disability Law (Required for this Specialty)

• ADV 600 – Advocacy Skills in Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Role of Lawyers & Expert Witnesses

• CON 275 – The Americans with Disabilities Act: Law, Policy and Practice

• FAM 160 – Custody Evaluations, Juvenile & Family Law, & Mental Disabilities

• CRI 280 – Forensic Reports, the Role of Experts, and Forensic Ethics

• CRI 260 – Mental Disability and Criminal Law

• CRI 250 – Mental Health Issues in Jails and Prisons

• CRI 275 – Mental Illness, Dangerousness, the Police Power and Risk Assessment

• CRI 508 – Sex Offenders

• UCI 125 – Therapeutic Jurisprudence

• Trauma and Mental Disability

MA Forensic Electives (Select 1 course, 3 JJC MA Credits)

• PSY 701 – Criminal Behavior

• PSY 705 – Victimology

• PSY 714 – Alcoholism and Substance Abuse

• PSY 716 – The Evaluation and Treatment of the Juvenile Offender

• PSY 718 – Social Science Evidence in Court

• PSY 720 – Social Psychology and the Legal System

• PSY 726 – Mental Health Issues in Policing

• PSY 727 – Eyewitness Identification

• PSY 742 – Family Violence and Disputes

• PSY 746 – Empirical Profiling Methods

J.D. Program, New York Law School (86 Credits, including 12 transfer credits from John Jay College of Criminal Justice)

Required J.D. Courses (41 Credits)

• REQ 100 – Civil Procedure (4 Credits)

• REQ 200 – Constitutional Law I (3 Credits)

• REQ 250 – Constitutional Law II (3 Credits)

• REQ 300 – Contracts (3 Credits)

• REQ 400 – Criminal Law (3 Credits)

• REQ 650 – Evidence (3 Credits)

• REQ 600 – Lawyering (3 Credits)

• REQ 450 – Professional Responsibility (3 Credits)

• LWR 100 – Legal Reasoning, Writing and Research (3 Credits)

• REQ 150 – Legislation and Regulation (2 Credits)

• REQ 500 – Property (4 Credits)

• REQ 550 – Torts (4 Credits)

• LWR 200 – Written and Oral Advocacy (3 Credits)

J.D. Mental Disability Law Studies Electives (Select 4 courses 3 credits each, 12 Credit totals, maximum one per semester)

• CRI 507 – Survey of Mental Disability Law (Required for this Specialty)

* ADV 600 – Advocacy Skills in Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Role of Lawyers and Expert Witnesses

• CON 275 – The Americans with Disabilities Act: Law, Policy and Practice

• FAM 160 – Custody Evaluations, Juvenile & Family Law, & Mental Disabilities

• CRI 280 – Forensic Reports, the Role of Experts, and Forensic Ethics

• International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law

• CRI 260 – Mental Disability and Criminal Law

• CRI 250 – Mental Health Issues in Jails and Prisons

• CRI 275 – Mental Illness, Dangerousness, the Police Power and Risk Assessment

• Race, Gender, Class, and Mental Disability

• CRI 508 – Sex Offenders

• UCI 125 – Therapeutic Jurisprudence

• Trauma and Mental Disability

MA Transfer Credits from John Jay College of Criminal Justice to NYLS (12 Credits)

Required MA Courses (3 courses, 9 credits)

• PSY 700 – Mental Health Professionals, Social Science, and the Law

• PSY 734 – Criminal Psychological Assessment

• PSY 754 – Advanced Forensic Assessment

Elective (Choose one 3-Credit MA Course)

• PSY 701 – Criminal Behavior

• PSY 705 – Victimology

• PSY 714 – Alcoholism and Substance Abuse

• PSY 716 – The Evaluation and Treatment of the Juvenile Offender

• PSY 718 – Social Science Evidence in Court

• PSY 720 – Social Psychology and the Legal System

• PSY 726 – Mental Health Issues in Policing

• PSY 727 – Eyewitness Identification

• PSY 742 – Family Violence and Disputes

• PSY 821 – Empirical Profiling Methods

J.D. Additional Elective Courses (21 Credits)

Students must choose an additional 7 out of 250 other elective law school courses from groups outside the Mental Disability Law track, including those in administrative law, externship and clinic settings, constitutional law, criminal law, history philosophy sociology and theory of law, international law, professional skills, public interest law, and tort law. Course offerings vary from semester to semester, and the full catalog and listing are available online at the New York Law School website, www.nyls.edu.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What is the MA-JD Program?

A: The Four-Year MA/JD dual-degree program offers qualified students the opportunity to earn both a Master of Arts degree in Forensic Psychology at John Jay College (JJC), and a Juris Doctor degree in Law at New York Law School (NYLS), which may be completed in as little as four years.

The MA/JD Dual Degree Program will capitalize on New York Law School’s nationally renowned expertise in Mental Disability Law with John Jay College’s highly recognized specialization in Forensic Psychology, to develop lawyers who will be uniquely trained to advocate for the mentally disabled, as practitioners, policy makers and legal scholars. [Graduates will also be able to work as MA Psychologists exempt from doctoral-level licensure in limited NY State civil service job settings; and as MA Psychologists in various other states, depending upon their licensing laws].

Q: What is the Focus of the Program?

A: The focus of the program is on forensic psychology, and mental health disability law. In addition to the MA in forensic psychology, students will be required to include 12 online credits about aspects of mental health disability law offered by NYLS.

Q: How Many Credits are Required for Graduation?

A: The curriculum is composed of the existing required and elective courses for the MA and for the JD, requiring a combined total of 128 credits, including 42 credits for the completion of the MA Program in Forensic Psychology and 86 credits for the completion of the JD Program in Law. However, 12 New York Law School online credits focusing on mental disability law will be credited towards both the JD and the MA Program. Likewise 12 MA credits from the John Jay Forensic Psychology MA Program will be credited also to the New York Law School JD program. Consequently, due to the 24 transfer credits applied in the dual degree program, the actual number of credits taken will be 104, resulting in graduation for full-time students in four years instead of five.

Q: What is the Course Sequence?

A: Students may begin their training in either the MA or the JD program, but the first year must be exclusively in one program, followed by the second year exclusively in the other program. Students may then mix their courses between the two programs in their third and fourth years.

The MA Program in Forensic Psychology will consist of 24 required credits; 15 forensic elective credits, including 12 credits from the NY Law School Mental Health and Disability Law track; and 3 credits of externship. The JD from New York Law School will consist of 41 required credits, 12 credits from the Mental Disability Law Studies, 12 transfer credits from the JJC MA Forensic Psychology Program, and 21 additional law school elective credits.

A typical course sequence for a student choosing to start in the MA Program would look like this: First Year at JJC would cover Mental Health Professionals & the Law, Research Methods, Psychopathology, Statistics, Human Growth & Development, Criminal Psychological Assessment, Advanced Forensic Assessment, and Clinical Interviewing.

Second Year at NYLS would include Civil Procedure, Contracts, Torts, Legal Reasoning, Property, Criminal Law, Advocacy, Legislation, and Lawyering.

Third Year at both would include Survey of Mental Disability Law, Forensic Psychology Elective, Constitutional Law I, Two NYLS electives, Professional Responsibility, Mental Health Disability Elective, Constitutional Law II, and Evidence.

Fourth Year at both would include two NYLS Mental Health Disability (online) Electives, 5 additional NYLS electives, and the JJC psychology externship.

Q: What are the Admissions Requirements?

A: Applicants must apply to both programs for the joint dual-degree program. For admission to the MA Program, a bachelor’s degree, with an undergraduate minimum GPA of 3.0; GRE’s scores, with a minimum score of 1000 combined in Verbal and Quantitative [or the equivalent LSAT percentile]; a minimum of 12 combined psychology credits in undergraduate and graduate coursework; plus Statistics, and Research Methods, which can be taken upon admission to the program; plus a personal statement and recommendations. For further Graduate Admissions information at JJC, go tohttp://www.jjay.cuny.edu/451.php

NYLS JD admissions are competitive, and applications must be submitted in electronic format, and include an LSAT score, resume, and at least one letter of recommendation. Additional biographical, education, employment and other information is also required. For further details, go to http://www.nyls.edu/.

Q: What are Possible Post-Graduate Careers?

A: Attorneys with a specialization in Forensic Psychology and Mental Health Disability Law may consider work with nonprofit organizations or public interest law firms, representing individual clients denied services or rights, or advocating for systematic change. They may represent people with mental health disabilities regarding informed consent, guardianship, and access to community services. They may also work for nonprofit corporations such as hospitals; or government agencies at the state of federal level. Some possibilities include departments of mental health and disability, human services, state juvenile and adult correctional services, and health services; and various mental health profession regulatory agencies. Further career and employment information is available from NYLS at www.nyls.edu.

Q: Where Can I Obtain More Information About the Dual-Degree Program, and About New York Law School and John Jay College of Criminal Justice?

A: The JJC website is www.jjay.cuny.edu. The NYLS website is www.nyls.edu. These sites will direct students to the Admissions Offices of each program. Also, those with questions about the dual-degree program may contact the JJC office of Coordinator James Wulach, Ph.D., J.D., at Jwulach@jjay.cuny.edu, or call 212-237-8782; or at NYLS applicants may contact Lianne J. Bass, Esq., administrator of the Online Mental Disability Law Program, at 212-431-2125, or call 212-431-2125.

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Cruel and Unusual: Death Penalty Support in America at Lowest Levels in 40 Years

November 22, 2011 By Comments

This article describes the results of a recent Gallup Poll on death penalty support in the United States and reviews the history of the death penalty in America. International statistics are also provided, including a list of those countries that continue to use the death penalty as well as those that have abolished this form of punishment.

Recent Poll on Support for the Death Penalty in America

A recent Gallup Poll shows that support for the death penalty amongst Americans has reached a new low—the lowest it has been in the last 40 years. More than one-third of Americans (35%) now oppose the death penalty. This is the highest level of opposition that has been seen since March 1972—the year that the Supreme Court ruled the death penalty to be unconstitutional unless it was applied fairly.

Click here for the full article on the Gallup Poll

Evolution of the Death Penalty in the United States

Execution was an inherited part of American culture beginning before settlement of the colonies. The first recorded execution of an American settler took place in Virginia in 1608 when George Kendall was executed by firing squad for spying. Since that time, between 14,489 and 18,000 people have been executed in the United States under government authority.

In times before the formalization of the country under a single constitution, execution was a fairly common practice. Although crimes for which capital punishment was an option varied by locale, all colonies allowed for the death penalty at some point. For example, persons were given death sentences for suspected witchcraft activities, bestiality, “man stealing,” idolatry, and “cursing a parent” in the Massachusetts settlement. As the colonists fought for independence, execution was used a threat for desertion or treason. Finally, under the official government of the United States, allowance of the death penalty became a national standard. The Constitution set guidelines that permitted both federal and state executions.

Since 1776, the country has vacillated considerably in terms of consensus on death penalty policy. The ratification of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in 1791 did not halt executions, but has since given rise to numerous challenges including current questions about execution methods. States such as Michigan have held as death penalty abolitionists since 1852, while others, such as Texas, execute more people in one year than other states have ever executed.

Execution in the Twentieth Century

By the twentieth century, execution was an accepted practice of the American criminal justice system. In fact, 1935 saw a greater number of capital sentences than any other year to date. In the mid-1900s, executions for crimes other than murder still occurred, but with infrequency. By the 1960s, views about the death penalty had changed, and the number of condemned persons had declined. In 1968, the Supreme Court ordered a moratorium so as to review death penalty issues.

Furman v. Georgia

The decision in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, consolidated with two other cases, briefly halted capital punishment in the United States. Setting the political landscape for this decision, public opinion with regard to the death penalty had shifted significantly since its inception. In 1966, support for the death penalty reached its lowest point in America. A Gallup poll taken months before the Furman ruling found death penalty supporters only marginally outnumbering opponents. William Henry Furman, a relatively uneducated African American man, shot and killed the resident of the dwelling he was attempting to burglarize. After being convicted of murder and sentenced to death, Furman appealed, citing conflicts between his sentence and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; his appeal eventually being granted review by the Supreme Court. Rather than being a question of simple technicality, the appeal raised questions about the constitutionality of nationwide death penalty practices. On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger, ruled five to four that the death penalty was unconstitutional. It was opined that sentencing was often random, and juries were empowered with too much discretion. Each justice seemed to have different reasons for his opinion, and all issued separate opinions, resulting in the longest ever decision. Under the decision, all currently condemned persons were required to be re-sentenced to a noncapital punishment with no possibility of reinstating previous death sentences.

Rather than providing an ultimate answer to the question of capital punishment, the Furman ruling seemed to energize and further entrench activists on both sides of the issue. Within a day of the ruling, five states had declared intention to draft death penalty legislation that qualified under the new guidelines. Legislators worked quickly to reenact capital punishment and, in 1975, more people were sentenced to death in the United States than in any previously recorded year.

Gregg v. Georgia

One of many states to engage in a reworking of sentencing standards related to the death penalty following Furman, Georgia developed a bifurcated system. Specifically, to avoid the randomness cited as unconstitutional, Georgia’s revised procedures required a guilt or innocence phase of the trial for potential capital cases followed by a second phase wherein aggravating conditions must be proved and mitigating factors presented to jurors and/or judges. Under these guidelines, Troy Gregg was convicted of two counts of murder with the aggravating factor of armed robbery. He appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (and two other cases handed down simultaneously) the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was not, in and of itself, unconstitutional nor in conflict with evolving standards of decency, but rather an embedded part of the American justice system. So long as practices were not arbitrary, but instead were part of set criteria for determining sentencing, the court determined death penalty practices to be constitutional. In addition, it was required that potential capital crimes be narrowly defined, that a Supreme Court appeal be provided, and that mitigation be allowed. In sum, this decision clearly allowed for the sentencing and carrying out of executions.

Within six months of death penalty reinstatement, Gary Gilmore was legally executed in Utah. Since that time, additional challenges have been raised that have provided more guidance regarding capital punishment. For example, Coker v. Georgia (1977) determined that the crime of raping an adult could not be sanctioned with the death penalty.

Modern Day Methods

Following the pattern of the Supreme Court, some states have examined fairness issues and temporarily halted capital sentencing, only to have execution reinstated following a change in leadership. Currently, 38 states, the federal government, and the U.S. Military have some form of capital punishment. Modern-day methods of execution include lethal injection, electrocution, hanging, the firing squad, and the gas chamber. In addition to reinstating the practice of execution, the Gregg decision appears to have allowed for more frequent legal dialogue on the topic of capital punishment. Future dangerousness, race, and definition of aggravating factors, among other issues, have been addressed by the courts.

The Issue of Age

One area in which the courts have set limits on the death penalty is with regard to age. In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), both of which were ultimately heard by the Supreme Court, age at the time of the offense was considered in determining whether the death penalty could be imposed. In Stanford, the appellate was over age 17 at the time of the crime, and the court affirmed imposition of the death penalty. Thompson on the other hand, was only 15 when his crime was committed, and the court deter- mined that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment. Until 2005 the death penalty was not pursued when defendants were under 16 years of age at the time of the offense.

Relatively recently, the Supreme Court increased the age at which a person can be sanctioned with capital punishment. At the age of 17, Christopher Simmons plotted with two younger friends to kidnap and murder a female victim. He and another person broke into her home, bound her, and threw her from a bridge, resulting in her death. He was found guilty and sentenced to death, and the case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the court cited behavioral science literature finding that adolescents do not have the same level of maturity as adults and are more likely to behave impulsively. More importantly, the court considered a “national consensus” argument that involved the fact that only three states had executed an offender who was a juvenile at the time of the crime within the last decade. Finally, the court reviewed the positions of the international community, a minority of whom allow for the execution of minors. As such, the court set the standard for consideration of capital punishment at the age of 18 at the time of the offense.

The Issue of Mental Retardation or Developmental Disability

In addition to exploring the question of age, courts and legislators have reviewed mental status issues and their relevance to criminal sanctions. In Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) the Supreme Court determined that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was not specifically banned. More recently, in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the court reversed its earlier decision. In this case, Darryl Atkins and an accomplice were convicted of abducting, robbing, and killing a male victim. Despite Atkins’ documented IQ of 59, he was sentenced to death. Again, the Supreme Court cited the “national consensus” position, noting that the execution of mentally retarded individuals was not supported by state statutes and practices. In addition, it was held that the purported purposes of the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, were not satisfied by executing mentally retarded persons. As such, execution of these individuals was found to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court allowed for further review of this question as criteria for the determination of mental retardation were not specified.

The Issue of Mental Illness

Related to the issue of executing mentally retarded individuals is the issue of executing mentally ill individuals. Accepted standards of practice exist to ensure mentally ill persons are competent to stand trial and to determine whether an individual should be held criminally responsible for a given behavior. In Ford v. Wainwright (1986), the Supreme Court addressed whether mentally ill persons who have been sentenced to death should be executed. The court held that, under the Eighth Amendment, it was not acceptable to carry out a death sentence against a person so “insane” as not to understand the nature or purpose of the punishment (e.g., the punishment of death or its link to the commission of the crime). This ruling falls far short of exempting mentally ill individuals from execution. It appears likely, however, that further legal discourse on the topic is on the horizon.

Capital Punishment in the International Community

International developments within the last 20 years or so have produced a clear, strong trend away from capital punishment. The number of countries that have abolished the death penalty is at an all-time high and the international community has called upon those countries that still use the death penalty to sharply curtail its use. In addition, international agreements have expressed a strong preference for an end to all executions.

As of December, 2000, the number of countries that had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, whether in peacetime or wartime, totaled 76 with an additional 11 countries abolishing the death penalty for ordinary crimes in peacetime, and an additional 36 countries being considered de facto abolitionist as they had not executed anyone within the last 10 years. Thus, 37 percent (71 countries) of the international community had retained the death penalty as of the end of 2000, a significant decrease from the 56 percent that had retained the death penalty as of 1988 and the 47 percent that had retained it as of the end of 1995.

With respect to the number of executions that take place, China leads the world in overall number of executions. For the period 1994–1998, China executed a total of 12, 338 people (although some Chinese scholars estimate that the true number may be a lot higher); Iran executed the second highest number, with 505 executions; Saudi Arabia executed 465 people; Ukraine and Turkmenistan executed 389 and 373 people, respectively, although executions ceased during 1997 for both countries. The United States was sixth highest for that same period with 274 individuals being executed (93 of these in Texas). When the estimated annual rate per million population is examined for this same time period, Turkmenistan leads the international community with 14.92 people per million being executed annually, followed closely by Singapore with 13.93 people per million being executed annually; Saudi Arabia executed 4.65 people per million annually; and Belarus executed 3.20 people per million annually. China, although having the highest number of executions, executed 2.01 people per million annually and the United States was far lower at 0.20 people per million executed annually during that time period.

Recently, China has taken steps to respond to domestic and international criticism regarding its extensive use of capital punishment in an effort to reduce the high rate of executions. On October 30, 2006, China adopted new rules requiring that, as of January 1, 2007, all death sentences be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. The National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, approved this amendment, which restores a power that was stripped from the Supreme Court in 1983, in an effort to reduce the widespread and arbitrary use of the death penalty. China had been facing increasing criticism over the last few years after a number of executed individuals had later been proved innocent.

Countries that have Abolished the Death Penalty for All Crimes (n = 76)

Andorra, Angola, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d”Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marion, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slo- vak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican City State, Venezuela

Countries that have Abolished the Death Penalty for Ordinary Crimes in Peacetime (n = 11)

Albania, Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Cyprus, El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, Latvia, Mexico, Peru

Countries Considered to be de facto Abolishionist with no Executions in 10 Years or More  (n = 36)

Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (Republic), Dominica, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Jamaica, Laos, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nauru, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Samoa, Yugoslavia

Countries that still use the Death Penalty (n = 71)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwan- da, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe


Portions of this article were excerpted from: McLearen, A. M., & Zapf, P. A. (2007). The death penalty: A brief review of historical roots and current practices relevant to the mental health practitioner (pp. 295-319). In R. K. Ax & T. J. Fagan (Eds.), Corrections, mental health, and social policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

Image courtesy of crimeanddeviance.com

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Kaimowitz v. Michigan DMH (1973)

August 14, 2011 By Comments

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Kaimowitz v. Michigan DMH (1973)

42 U.S.L.W. 2063

Civil No. 73-1934-AW

Nature of Case

Whether involuntarily committed psychiatric patients can voluntarily consent to psychosurgery.

Facts of Case

On January 11, 1955, the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court committed John Doe to Ionia State Hospital in Michigan, as a sexual psychopath, without a trial. At the time of his commitment, he was 18 years old and his commitment followed the charges of rape and murder of a student nurse. He was never offered a hearing, was never offered psychotherapy as a form of treatment, and he was labeled “treatment resistant.”

In 1972, at 36 years old, he was asked to participate in a state-funded experimental study, which aimed to determine the efficacy of two treatment methods for reducing aggression. One method was a medication, cyproterone acetate (antiandrogen), which was expected to result in impotence and reduce aggression. The other method was a psychosurgical procedure called an amygdalotomy, which was also expected to reduce aggression. Doe and his parents gave consent for Doe to participate in the study. His consent was reviewed by a committee of three neurologists and a human rights review committee, which consisted of a law and psychiatry professor, a clergyman, and a community representative. His consent was considered valid and he was the only consenting subject involved in the study. The consent form discussed that the patients may receive psychosurgery and described potential risks; however, the consent form did not mention the right to withdraw from the study.

Gabe Kaimowitz, a Michigan Legal Services attorney, unrelated to the Doe case, learned of the experiment and informed the media. Kaimowitz filed a petition that Doe and others were being held for experimental surgery. Doe was appointed independent counsel and a habeas corpus petition was submitted on his behalf asserting that he was being illegally detained because the Michigan criminal sexual psychopath statute was unconstitutional. The statute had previously been repealed; however, those already committed under the statute were retained in custody. On March 23, 1973, Doe was granted his freedom, because the court held the statute could not withstand the challenge of the equal protection clause. Following his notification of release, Doe retracted his consent. He did not commit any additional acts of violence, earned a job, and became engaged; however, the state of Michigan then pursued criminal prosecution against him for the 19-year-old charges of rape and murder. Even without Doe, the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan decided to pursue the hearing of the case concerning the ability to voluntarily consent to psychosurgery, as it applied to all current and future involuntary patients.

Issue

Can involuntarily hospitalized psychiatric patients voluntarily consent to psychosurgery?

 

Holding

The Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan ruled that involuntarily detained mental patients could not give informed consent for psychosurgery. The court decided that basic elements of informed consent could not be obtained reliably due to their involuntary status. The court indicated that involuntarily committed patients were incapable of giving competent, voluntary, and knowledgeable consent to experimental psychosurgical operations. The court also asserted that 1st Amendment rights to speech and expression could be destroyed or impaired by psychosurgery, and the constitutional right to privacy could be infringed upon by the psychosurgical intrusion into an individual’s brain.

Rationale

The court cited provisions of the Nuremberg Code and indicated voluntary consent was absolutely essential for psychosurgery. The court indicated that the consent of involuntarily committed patients for psychosurgery generally would not meet the requirements because their consent was not 1) competent, 2) voluntary, and 3) knowledgeable. The court defined competency as “the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the procedure, its risks, and other relevant information.” The court argued the legal capacity to consent was diminished by the nature of incarceration, which made the individual more vulnerable to coercion. The court asserted that “involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive institutional environment” and “are not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent inequality in their position.” The court concluded that any attempt at obtaining voluntary consent for psychosurgery would be invalid. Valid consent requires the knowledge of the risks and ill effects that may come from participation. The court stated that since much was still unknown concerning the brain and brain surgery, that the “lack of knowledge on the subject makes a knowledgeable consent to psychosurgery literally impossible.” Therefore, the court made an absolute ban on psychosurgery for involuntarily committed psychiatric patients.

Filed Under: Legal Briefs, Professional Info Tagged With: ,

Jaffee v. Redmond (1996)

August 11, 2011 By Comments

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Jaffee v. Redmond (1996)

United States Supreme Court

518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct.

Nature of Case

Whether it is appropriate for federal courts to recognize a “psychotherapist privilege” under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Facts of Case

On June 27, 1991, Officer Mary Lu Redmond responded to a call at an apartment building concerning a “fight in progress.” She was the first officer to arrive at the scene. Two women (sisters of the deceased) ran towards Redmond’s car stating there had been a stabbing. Two men then ran out of the building, one wielding a pipe. They ignored her orders to get to the ground and she allegedly drew her gun. Two additional men came running out, with Ricky Allen (the deceased) chasing another, allegedly brandishing a butcher knife. Allen disregarded Redmond’s statement to drop the knife, and she shot Allen, before he could stab the other man. Allen died at the scene. Petitioners of his estate filed suit in federal court alleging Redmond had violated Allen’s constitutional right against the use of excessive force. Allen’s family offered a different version of the events, stating Redmond drew her gun before exiting her car and that Allen was unarmed when he emerged from the building. During pretrial discovery the petitioner learned that Redmond had sought counseling with a licensed social worker and sought access to the notes of their sessions. The district court ordered disclosure of the social worker’s notes for the therapy sessions; however, neither the therapist nor Redmond complied with the court order. Additionally during deposition and on the witness stand, both refused to answer certain questions and reported an inability to recall details of their conversations. At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the refusal to release the notes had no “legal justification” and informed the jury they could presume the information contained within the notes was most likely unfavorable to the defendant. The jury awarded the petitioner $45,000 on the federal claim and $500,000 on the state-law claim. The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court decision, stating that there was a psychotherapist-patient privilege; however, this privilege could be negated if the evidentiary need for disclosure outweighed the patient’s interests. In this case, because of numerous eyewitnesses, the appellate court decided that Redmond’s privacy interests outweighed the evidentiary needs. The United States Supreme Court granted cert due to the importance of the question and the conflict among appellate courts regarding psychotherapist privilege.

Issue

Did the Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit err in determining that federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist privilege under 501, but do so on a case-by-case basis contingent upon whether the interests of justice outweigh the privacy interests of the patient?

Holding

In a 7 to 2 decision, with an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court affirmed the appellate court decision and concluded Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized privilege protecting confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient, and this privilege extended beyond psychiatrists and psychologists to social workers. The court held that statements that Redmond made to her therapist and the notes taken by her therapist were protected from compelled disclosure. However, the Court rejected the balancing component of the privilege implemented by the appellate court, stating that “it would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege by making it impossible for participants to predict whether their confidential conversations would be protected. The court also stated that it was “neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a way that would govern all future questions.” The Court mentioned only that “the patient may of course waive the protection,” and that there was no doubt that there would be situations in which the privilege could be broken, such as “serious threat of harm to the patient or to others” which could only be averted by “means of a disclosure by a therapist.”

Rationale

The court reasoned that all 50 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Therefore, “any State’s promise of confidentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a federal court,” and denial of the privilege in federal court would frustrate the purpose of state legislation on the matter. Furthermore, the Court noted that “reason and experience” has persuaded the Court that confidential communications between the parties “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.” The Court indicated the need for trust in their therapeutic relationship is paramount and “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.” The Court also indicated that this protection applies broadly beyond psychologists and psychiatrists in many states and federal privilege should extend to social workers, such as the one involved in this case.

Concerning their decision on removal of the balancing privilege, the Court reasoned that a patient “must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”

Dissenting opinion

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that psychotherapist-client privilege could result in occasional injustice. They reasoned that if an individual “wishes the benefits of telling the truth she must also accept the adverse consequences.” Justice Scalia questioned when it was that “the psychotherapist came to play such an indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry’s mental health?” It was argued that an individual’s mental health would be more impaired by preventing an individual from receiving advice from his mother, and yet no mother-child privilege existed. Additionally, it was argued that the extension of privilege should not be granted beyond psychologist and psychiatrists to social workers by the Court. It was alleged that psychologists and psychiatrists “do nothing but psychotherapy,” but social workers have multiple roles, and not all of them need to be confidential. Additionally, it was argued that the training of social workers was not of the same caliber as doctors, and they were not “experts” in the area of psychotherapy. It was also argued that the question of whether social workers should be granted the extension of a psychotherapist privilege was a matter to be handled by Congress, not the Court.

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